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I. INTRODUCTION 
The link between wealth creation and growth of knowledge is a shared theme in a variety of 
writings of economists, evolutionary economists in particular.1 From Marshall to Schumpeter 
and Hayek, the dynamics of economic progress and its connection to innovation and economic 
adaptation to emergent novelty apprehended extensive investigation.2 From the perspective 
of these evolutionary economists, knowledge and information are critical economic resources 
in modern economy.3 To this end, a recent report (the Venturous Australia Report) affirms 
that information is central to the functioning of the economic system.4 
Hayek believes that compared to governments, markets act more effectively to optimize the 
generation and handling of information; however other economists disagree with this 
assertion.5 The best approach is likely to be produced by some appropriate hybrid of the two.6 
Modern copyright law (and other laws of intellectual property), as a legal instrument (if not 
the only one7) regulating the production and flow of information,8 endeavors to sustain this 
hybrid. Without copyright excluding those who have not paid for the production of 
information and knowledge from profiting from it, markets (in theory) cannot afford 
sufficient incentives for the creation and dissemination of useful information and knowledge. 
However, the changing social context, such as the application of new media and 
communication technologies, new production of knowledge, 9  and especially the 
democratisation of creativity, has brought about continuing challenges to this regulatory 
framework. In this networked information society, the prevalence of a participatory and 
read/write culture and the rise of everyday creativity are reflections of the transformation of 
the dynamics of knowledge generation and the flow of information. Accordingly, copyright 
                                                     
1 See generally, Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (8th edition, Macmillan and Co., Ltd. 1920. First edition published 1890); 
Joseph Schumpeter, ‘Capitalism Socialism and Democracy’ (Routledge, London, 1943); Joseph Schumpeter, ‘The Theory of 
Economic Development’ (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1934); Friedrich A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order 
(1948). 
2 ‘[These] diverse writers are linked by a thread of evolutionary reasoning made evident in their treatment of the dynamics of 
economic development, its connection to innovation and economic adaptation of emergent novelty and, more deeply, to the link 
between wealth creation and the growth of knowledge.’ See further, J.S. Metcalfe, ‘The Broken Thread: Marshall, Schumpeter and 
Hayek on the Evolution of Capitalism’ (Presented at the International Workshop “Marshall, Schumpeter, and Social Science”, 17-19th 
March 2007, Sano Shoin, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo). 
3 For further discourses on the importance of knowledge and information in the contemporary economy, see Daniel Belll, The Coming 
of Post-Industrial Society: a Venture in Social Forecasting (Basic Books, Inc., 1976); Fred L. Block, Postindustrial Possibilities: A 
Critique of Economic Discourse (University of California Press, 1990); Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism (New Left Books, 1975); 
Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Duke University Press, 1991). 
4 Cutler & Company Pty Ltd, Venturous Australia: Building Strenght in Innovation (2008) 88-91. 
5 Ibid, 88. 
6 In examining the enabling role of government in promoting innovation, the Venturous Australia Report considered two primary 
issues: First, when designing regulations, defining property rights, promoting standards and, indeed the terms of market interaction, 
governments can encourage innovation by ensuring that pioneer firms and entrepreneurs can receive the appropriate reward in the 
market-place from their innovative efforts. Second, governments can promote good information flows both by finessing the ‘rule of 
the game’ in markets and by ensuring that the information and other content that they fund is widely and freely available to be used by 
consumers, and to be re-used and transformed into new value-added products by firms further down the production chain. See further, 
ibid 81-98. 
7 ‘[Copyright] is not the only area of law that governs information practices. For instance, securities laws, privacy laws, defamation 
laws, right of publicity, and the laws of black mail and unfair competition all regulate information practices. Copyright’s regulation of 
information practices, however, is more fundamental and considerably more expansive.’ See Dan Hunter and F. Gregory Lastowka, 
‘Amateur-to-Amateur’ (2004) 46 (3) William and Mary Law Review 959. 
8 See further, Benedict Atkinson and Professor Brian Fitzgerald, ‘Copyright as an Instrument of Information Flow and 
Dissemination:the case of ICE TV Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd’ (2008) <http://eprints.qut.edu.au/archive/00015208/> at 
18 October 2008. 
9 On how the production of knowledge and the process of research were being radically transformed, see further Michael Gibbons et al, 
The New Production of Knowledge (Sage Publications Ltd, 1994). See also James Curry, ‘The Dialectic of Knowledge-in-Production: 
Value Creation in Late Capitalism and the Rise of Knowledge-Centered Production’ (1997) 2 (3) Electronic Journal of Sociology 
<http://www.sociology.org/content/vol002.003/curry.html> at 18 October 2008. 
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law more than ever plays an increasing role (in both a positive and negative sense) in the 
assurance of the flow of information, and thus in promotion of the growth of economy.10 
In a positive sense, as empirical studies show, copyright has generated profound economic 
rewards for labour and investment in the production and dissemination of information and 
knowledge. Consequently, the economic contribution of copyright-based industries11 to the 
world economy continues growing in the past years. For example, the value added by the 
total copyright industries accounted for $1.254 trillion or 12% of the U.S. GDP in 2002,12 $1.3 
trillion or 11.09% in 2004 and $1.38 trillion or 11.12% in 2005.13 Notably, a recent report on 
fair use in the U.S. economy indicated that industries that rely on “fair use” exceptions to 
copyright contribute $4.5 trillion or 1/6 of U.S. GDP annually. 14  The total copyright 
industries contributed 5.38% to the Canadian economy in 2002, compared to 3.87% in 1991.15 
In Australia, the contribution of copyright industries increased from 2.2% of its GDP in 1980-
81 to 3.3% in 1999-2000.16 In China, copyright sector contributes 6 percent of its GDP in 
2005.17 
On the other hand, the negative effects of copyright (and other intellectual property) on the 
generation and flow of information and knowledge have raised universal concern. 18  In 
particular, the danger of threatening and stifling creativity caused by the law of copyright 
has been pointed out and investigated extensively by scholars.19 The initial intention of 
                                                     
10 As a result, recent decades see ongoing debates as to how intellectual property laws help or hurt a society in any particular situation. 
See further, Michael A. Gollin, Driving Innovation: Intellectual Property Strategies for a Dynamic World (Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) 36 -59. 
11 According to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), copyright-based industries include: (1) Core copyright industries, 
defined as wholly engaged in the creation, production, performance, exhibition, communication or distribution and sales of copyright 
protected subject matter. These include literature, music, theatre, film, the media, photography, software, visual arts, advertising 
services and collective management societies. (2) Inter-dependent copyright industries, which deal with products jointly consumed 
with the core industries, or with facilitation equipment. They include the manufacture and sale of equipment such as television sets, 
CD recorders and computers; of musical and photographic instruments; of photocopying and recording material, etc. They provide the 
means for the production, dissemination and consumption of copyright goods and services. (3) Partial copyright industries, in which 
only part of the production is linked to copyright protected material, such as design, architecture, jewelry, furniture and other crafts., 
etc. (The element attributable to copyright varies according to the extent to which they are protected by copyright legislation). (4) 
Non-dedicated support industries, which only remotely rely on copyright material, and where copyright generates a very small portion 
of their business, such as telephony, transportation and general wholesale. The copyright-related contribution of these industries is 
calculated on the basis of an appropriately weighted copyright factor. See further, WIPO, Guide on Surveying the Economic 
Contribution of the Copyright-Based Industrie (2003). 
12 See further, Stephen E. Siwek, Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy (the 2004 Report). 
13 See further, Stephen E. Siwek, Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy (the 2006 Report). 
14 See further, Thomas Rogers and Andrew Szamosszegi, Fair use in the U.S. Economy: Economic Contribution of Industries Relying 
on Fair Use (Prepared for the Computer & Communication Industry Association, 2007). 
15 See further, Wall Communications Inc., The Economic Contribution of Copyright Industries to the Canadian Economy (prepared for 
Canadian Heritage, March 31, 2004). 
16 See further, The Allen Consulting Group, The Economic Contribution of Australia’s Copyright Industries (Prepared for Australian 
Copyright Council and Centre for Copyright Studies, 2001). 
17 People's Daily Online <http://english.people.com.cn/200505/25/eng20050525_186756.html> at 19 October 2008; see also 
<http://nigeria2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/chinanews/200506/20050600109293.html> at 19 October 2008. 
18 ‘Critics seek to restrict or even eliminate some types of intellectual property protection, using eight different afruments based on 
concerns about negative consequences. These arguments may be summarized as theories based on restricted access to technology, 
increased cost, monopolization inappropriate investment incentives, competition, expense, institutional requirements, and ethics.’ See 
further, Michael A. Gollin, Driving Innovation: Intellectual Property Strategies for a Dynamic World (Cambridge University Press, 
2008) 40-47. See also, Marci A. Hamilton, ‘The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective’ (1996) 29 (3) 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 613-634; Jerome H. Reichman, ‘Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: 
Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System’,  (1995) 13 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 475-
520; Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights: A medical prize fund could improve the financing of drug innovations’ 
(2006) 333 British Medical Journal 1279-1280; Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (UK),  Integrating Intellectual Property 
Rights and Development Policy (2002) <http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/final_report.htm> at 18 October 2008; 
Michael Heller, The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives (Basic Book, 
July 2008). 
19 See generally, Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How it Threatens Creativity 
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copyright law was to encourage learning and continued production of books;20 however, it 
‘has developed as a way to reward the haves’ 21 and has in fact departed from its original 
purpose. 
The aberration of copyright’s effects may be attributed to many factors among which the 
changing social context is a prominent one. The purpose of copyright law is to optimize 
creativity of people including both authors and users of creative materials. To accomplish 
this aim, copyright law must maintain a balance between stimulating creativity of authors 
(and potential authors) through rewarding creation with monopoly rights and enhancing 
creativity of individual users through encouraging access to information and knowledge. The 
ways in which such a balance could be sustained may vary in different social contexts. After 
examining the incentive structure and effect of copyright and arising new possibilities to 
enhance public literacy and individual creativity, this chapter articulates the purpose of 
copyright law for this networked information society and furthermore investigates how this 
aim could be accomplished. 
II. CREATIVITY IN A PARTICIPATORY CULTURE −THE 
CHANGING SOCIAL CONTEXT FOR REGULATING INFORMATION FLOW 
A participatory culture is a society in which people can grow up and play with creativity in 
their daily life. This has not only changed our conception of creativity but also changed how 
our culture can be produced, distributed, used and re-used. This is of significant implications 
to a vast variety of area such as education, media, sociology and law, especially the law of 
copyright. 
A. Creativity in Theory 
a) Creativity: Definitions, Characteristics and the Dark Side 
Most research has implied that creativity is beneficial as ‘it facilitates and enhances problem 
solving, adaptability, self-expression, and health’. 22  However, creativity is easy to be 
perceived but hard to be defined.23 In Jacobellis v. Ohio, realising the impossibility to define 
hardcore pornography adequately, Justice Potter Stewart couldn’t help but contended, ‘I 
know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.’ 24 Similarly, it 
also seems hardly possible to define what creativity exactly is. As Hausman commented, 
‘Creativity is a bit like pornography; it is hard to define, but we think we know it when we 
                                                                                                                                                             
(NYU Press, 2003); Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: The Nature and Future of Creativity (Penguin Press, 2005); Lawrence Lessig, 
Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace, Version 2.0 (Basic Books, 2006); Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive 
in the Hybrid Economy (Penguin Press, October 2008). 
20 See generally, Ronan Deazley, On the Origin of the Right to Copy: Creating the Movement of Copyright Law in Eighteenth-Century 
Britain (1695 – 1775) (Hart Publishing, 2004). 
21 Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How it Threatens Creativity (NYU Press, 
2003) 5-6. 
22 Mark A. Runco, ‘Creativity’ (2004) 55 Annual Review of Psychology 677. 
23 For definitions of ‘creativity’, see C. W. Taylor. ‘Various approaches to and definitions of creativity’ in Robert J. 
Sternberg (ed.), The nature of creativity: Contemporary Psychological Perspectives (1988), 99-121; H. J. Eysenck, 
‘Creativity and personality’, in Mark A. Runco (ed.), The creativity research handbook (Volume 1) (1997), 41-66; Carl 
R. Hausman, 1998, ‘Creativity: Conceptual and Historical Overview’ in Michael Kelly (ed.), Encyclopedia of 
Aesthetics (Vol. 1) (1998), 453-456; Robert J. Sternberg and Tood I. Lubart, ‘The Concept of Creativity: Prospects and 
Paradigms’ in Robert J. Sternberg (ed.), Handbook of Creativity (1999), 3-15. 
24 378 U.S. 184 (1964) 
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see it.’25 According to their main themes, Taylor has divided over 60 different definitions of 
creativity into five classes.26 Franken defines creativity as ‘the tendency to generate or 
recognize ideas, alternatives, or possibilities that may be useful in solving problems, 
communicating with others, and entertaining ourselves and others.’27 Csikszentmihalyi sees 
creativity as ‘any act, idea, or product that changes an existing domain or that transforms an 
existing domain into a new one.’28 Misztal notes that ‘[any] attempt to define creativity is 
faced with the question as to whether creativity is a property of people, products or cognitive 
process.’29 She continues ‘[dictionary] definitions present it as the ability to bring something 
new into existence, the ability to use the imagination to make new syntheses and the ability 
to produce something that is considered both novel and original, while also stressing that the 
notion is connected with unusual brightness or intelligence.’30 
Creativity is observed and investigated in a variety of contexts and fields, such cognitive 
science, psychology, human intelligence, social and cultural studies. Studies show, although 
the problem of creativity is beset with mysticism, confused definitions, different definitions 
are reflection and manifestation of different types of creativity.31 It is also asserted that 
‘[creativity] is a topic of wide scope that is important at both the individual and societal 
levels for a wide range of task domains.’32 Therefore, ‘[at] an individual level, creativity is 
relevant, for example, when one is solving problems on the job and in daily life. At a societal 
level, creativity can lead to new scientific findings, new movement in art, new inventions, 
and new social programs.’33 
One interesting observation is that if you ‘ask most people to define creativity as a generic 
term’, they will ‘nearly always think of some form solitary artistic endeavor.’34 However, 
research reveals that ‘most modern creative projects are collective’. 35 In most cases, ‘one or 
two individuals may “spark” off the process but the ideas that make the project “real” come 
from a variety of other people at various stages of the project.’ 36  In addition, another 
observation is that most people ‘tend to associate creativity with the arts and to think of it as 
                                                     
25 Inouye Alan S. et al., Beyond Productivity: Information, Technology, Innovation, and Creativity (2003), 16; Carl R. 
Hausman, 1998, ‘Creativity: Conceptual and Historical Overview’ in Michael Kelly (ed.), Encyclopedia of Aesthetics 
(Vol. 1) (1998), 453-456. Unsurprisingly, the Court are also unwilling to attempt further to define creativity. For 
example, although it affirmed that a work must contain a modicum of creativity to obtain copyright protection, in 
Feist v. Rural Telephone Service Company, 499 U.S. 340 (1991), U.S. Supreme Court refused to define what 
creativity actually is. But a Feist definition of “creativity” could be deduced from the Court’s judgment. See further, 
Russ VerSteeg, ‘Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law’ in Peter K. Yu (ed), Intellectual Property and 
Information Wealth: Issues and Practices in the Digital Age (Vol. 1 Copyright and Related Rights) (2007) 4-6. 
26 Calvin W. Taylor. ‘Various approaches to and definitions of creativity’ in Robert J. Sternberg (ed.), The nature of 
creativity: Contemporary Psychological Perspectives (1988), 99-121. 
27 Robert E. Franken, Human Motivation (2001), 396. 
28 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention (1997), 28. 
29 Barbara A. Misztal, Intellectuals and the Public Good (2007), 38. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Judith Gluck et al., ‘How Creatives Define Creativity: Definitions Reflect Different Types of Creativity’, (2002) 14 
(1) Creativity Research Journal, 55-67. 
32 Robert J. Sternberg and Tood I. Lubart, ‘The Concept of Creativity: Prospects and Paradigms’ in Robert J. 
Sternberg (ed.), Handbook of Creativity (1999), 3. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Michel Syrett and Jean Lammiman, Creativity (2002), 6;  
35 Ibid, 11. 
36 Ibid. 
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the expression of highly original ideas’.37 Unsurprisingly, in the area of arts and literature, 
creativity is heavily related to originality. 
In many circumstances, creativity is the interpretation of the past and the rearrangement of 
the existing elements (materials, ideas and values). The historical analyses concern a bit 
about the self-destructive power of creativity.38 Creativity, form the historical perspective, 
‘leads to things that have some value, but value varies from group to group and era to era’.39 
‘While creativity has been associated with problem solving and value enhancing through 
proactive actions, it has also been linked with potential costs to the individual and to the 
society at large.’ 40  As McLaren observes, there exists a dark side to creativity and it 
represents ‘a quest for a radical autonomy apart from the constraints of social 
responsibility’.41 In a recent featured article and ensuing commentaries, Cropley et al have 
also revealed the same concerns in their very insightful discourses of malevolent creativity.42 
b) Creativity, Innovation and Economy 
Creativity could be distinguished from innovation in many ways; but none of them are 
perfect as there are always likely to be some overlaps. Something that helps to solve 
problems or has some utility of some sort could be ‘creative’; but it could also be called 
‘innovative’. Researchers suggest that creativity is often self-expressive and intrinsically 
motivated however innovation is often driven by extrinsic incentives and the need to destruct 
old standards. 43 From the perspective of Schumpeterism, innovation is essentially a new 
production function. In other words, innovation is an introduction of new elements and 
conditions or new combination of existing elements and conditions to the production and 
economy system.44 Furthermore, Schumpeterism argues that innovation is the force that 
drives economic progress when it is propagated to the point of “creative destruction” by 
successful entrepreneurship.45 
Another distinction between creativity and innovation is suggested in the light of originality. 
For example, Runco argued that innovation often requires that the result is maximally 
effective however originality is secondary, though necessary. In contrast, ‘creative 
                                                     
37 Teresa M. Amabile, ‘How to Kill Creativity’, (1998) 76 (5) Harvard Business Review, 78. 
38 For further discussion on the historical analyses of creativity, please see Mark A. Runco, Creativity: Theories and 
Themes: Research, Development, and Practice (2006), 215-220. 
39 Ibid, 217. 
40 Wikibooks <http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Systems_Theory/Creativity> at 9 September 2008. 
41 Robert B. McLaren, ‘Dark side of creativity’, in Steven R. Pritzker and Mark A. Runco (eds), Encyclopedia of 
Creativity (Vol. 1) (1999), 483-491.  
42 David H. Cropley, ‘Malevolent Creativity: A Functional Model of Creativity in Terrorism and Crime’, (2008) 20 (2) 
Creativity Research Journal, 105-115; Keith James and Damon Drown, ‘Whether “Malevolent” or “Negative,” 
Creativity Is Relevant to Terrorism Prevention: Lessons From 9/11 and Hazardous Material Trucking’, (2008) 20 (2) 
Creativity Research Journal, 120-127; Marc T. Spooner, ‘Commentary on Malevolent Creativity’, (2008) 20 (2) 
Creativity Research Journal, 128-129; Jeffrey J. Walczyk and Diana A. Griffith-Ross, ‘Commentary on the 
Functional Creativity Model: Its Application to Understanding Innovative Deception’, (2008) 20 (2) Creativity 
Research Journal, 130-133; David H. Cropley, ‘Rejoinder to Commentaries on Malevolent Creativity: A Functional 
Model of Creativity in Terrorism and Crime, Cropley, Kaufman, and Cropley’, (2008) 20 (2) Creativity Research 
Journal, 134-136. 
43 Mark A. Runco, Creativity: Theories and Themes: Research, Development, and Practice (2006) 380-382; see also G. Clydesdale, 
‘Creativity and Competition: The Beatles’ (2006) 18 (2) Creativity Research Journal 129-139. 
44 Joseph Schumpeter, ‘The Theory of Economic Development’ (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1934). See 
also Joseph Schumpeter, ‘Capitalism Socialism and Democracy’ (Routledge, London, 1943). 
45 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1975), 82-85. 
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performances that are not innovative, such as the arts, originality may be much more 
important, whereas effectiveness is secondary.’46 
Many researchers have seen ‘creativity as a prerequisite for innovation’47 and innovation 
‘springs from the creative application of knowledge’.48 Amabile et al define that creativity is 
the production of novel and useful ideas, approaches or actions, while innovation is the 
process of successful implementation of creative ideas. It is thus argued that, ‘[in] this view, 
creativity by individuals and teams is a starting point of innovation; the first is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for the second Successful innovation depends on other factors as 
well’. 49  Therefore, the occurrence of for innovation requires something more than the 
generation of a creative idea or insight. 
B. Democratisation of Creativity and the Rise of Participatory and 
Read/Write Culture 
a) Participatory and Read/Write Culture 
According to studies from the Pew Internet Project in U.S., 44% of U.S. Internet users have 
contributed their thoughts and their files to the online world50 and more than half of online 
teenagers have created content for the Internet.51 A more recent study has found that 64% of 
online teens have participated in one or more among a wide range of content-creating 
activities on the Internet, up from 57% of online teens in a similar survey at the end of 
2004.52 In Australia, a newly released report has found just under a quarter of Internet users 
(23.3%) posted on discussion or message boards with around half of these people (13.8%) 
doing so at least weekly, nearly 12.1% of people kept a personal website, less than 8% kept a 
blog, under a quarter of users posted pictures or photographs (24.8%) and only 4.8% posted 
videos.53 In People’s Republic of China, the latest CNNIC 22nd Statistical Survey Report on 
the Internet Development in China has found that by the end of June 2008, the amount of 
netizens54 in China had reached 253 million, surpassing that in the United States to be the 
                                                     
46 Mark A. Runco, Creativity: Theories and Themes: Research, Development, and Practice (2006), 383. 
47 Stefan Seidel et al., A Conceptual Framework for Information Retrieval in Pockets of Creativity (Proceedings 16th 
European Conference on Information Systems, Galway, Ireland, 2008), 
<http://eprints.qut.edu.au/archive/00013888/> at 18 Sep. 2008. 
48 Shahid Yusuf, ‘From Creativity to Innovation’ (World Bank Policy Research Working Pater 4262, June 2007) 
49 Teresa M. Amabile et al., ‘Assessing the Work Environment for Creativity’, (1996) 39 (5) The Academy of 
Management Journal, 1154-1155. 
50 Amanda Lenhart et al, ‘Content Creations Online’ (Pew Internet and American Life Project,  February 2004) 
<http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/113/report_display.asp> at 20 September 2008. 
51 Amanda Lenhart and Mary Madden, ‘Teen Content Creators and Consumers’ (Pew Internet and American Life 
Project, November 2005) <http://www.pewinternet.org/ppf/r/166/report_display.asp> at 20 September 2008. 
52 39% of online teens share their own artistic creations online, such as artwork, photos, stories, or videos, up from 
33% in 2004; 33% create or work on webpages or blogs for others, including those for groups they belong to, friends, 
or school assignments, basically unchanged from 2004 (32%); 28% have created their own online journal or blog, up 
from 19% in 2004; 27% maintain their own personal webpage, up from 22% in 2004; 26% remix content they find 
online into their own creations, up from 19% in 2004. Therefore, the Report concludes that the use of social media 
gains a greater foothold in teen life as they embrace the conversational nature of interactive online media. See 
further, Amanda Lenhart et al, ‘Teens and Social Media’ (Pew Internet and American Life Project, December 2007) 
<http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Teens_Social_Media_Final.pdf> at 20 September 2008. 
53 Scott Ewing et al, ‘CCi Digital Futures Report: The Internet in Austuralia’ (July 2008) 
<http://www.cci.edu.au/sites/default/files/pbrowne/AuDigitalFutures2008.pdf> at 20 September 2008. 
54 Netizen is defined by CNNIC as any Chinese citizen aged 6 and above who have use the Internet in the past half a 
year. See China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), ‘22nd Statistical Report on the Internet 
Development in China’ (July 2008) <http://www.cnnic.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2008/8/15/145744.pdf> at 20 September 
2008. 
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first place in the world. 55  The report has also revealed that ‘the ownership rate of 
blog/personal space and access rate of forum/BBS have ascended into the top ten Internet 
applications (42.3% of netizens owned blog or personal space; 38.8% visited online 
forum/BBS and 23.4% published posters).56 Moreover, according to an earlier report, the 
number of network video users in China has reached 160 million.57 
In many cases, these people (Internet users in the above studies) are actively involved in 
what has been called ‘participatory culture’. In contrast to a consumer culture, a 
participatory culture is a culture in which individual persons do not only act as consumers 
but also as contributors or producers. Being acting as both consumers and producers, these 
individuals are called ‘prosumers’.58 In 1972, McLuhan and Nevitt suggested that with the 
advance of digital technology, the consumer would become a producer.59 Eight years later, 
Toffler coined the term ‘prosumer’ and predicted the rise of the prosumer. He pointed out 
that the role of producers and consumer would become to blur and even merge.60 
Jenkins et al have defined participatory culture as one: (1) with relatively low barriers to 
artistic expression and civic engagement; (2) with strong support for creating and sharing 
one’s creations with others; (3) with some type of informal mentorship whereby what is 
known by the most experienced is passed along to novices; (4) where members believe that 
their contributions matter; (5) where members feel some degree of social connection with one 
another (at the least they care what other people think about what they have created).61 
Furthermore, in such a world, ‘not every member must contribute, but all must believe they 
are free to contribute when ready and that what they contribute will be appropriately 
valued’.62 
From the perspective of technological development, the prevalence of the participatory 
culture is enabled and afforded by the popularity of a participative web. According to studies 
and reports from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
participatory web refers to the Internet which has been powered by intelligent web services 
and new Internet-based software application and, therefore, allows the active participation of 
users in creating, extending, rating, commenting on and distributing digital content and even 
customizing and developing Internet applications.63 What is the most insistent phenomenon 
generated by the participatory culture and participative web is the rise of “user-created 
content’’ (UCC) or “user-generated content” (UGC).64 
                                                     
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), ‘Research Report on the Network Video Market and 
Netizens’ Video Consumption in China 2008’ <http://www.cnnic.cn/html/Dir/2008/06/20/5198.htm> at 20 September 
2008. 
58 Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prosumer> at 20 September 2008.  
59 Marshall McLuhan and Barrington Nevitt, Take today; the executive as dropout (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1972) 4. 
60 Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (1980), 265-288. 
61 Henry Jenkins et al, ‘Confronting the Challenges of Participatory Culture: Media Education for the 21st Century’ 
(MacArthur Foundation, 2007) 7-11. 
62 Ibid, 7. 
63 OECD, Information Technology Outlook 2006 (OECD Publishing, November 2006) 246; OECD, Participatory Web 
and User-Created Content (OECD Publishing, 2007) 17-18. 
64 See further the cultural, economic, social and legal implications of UCC/UGC, OECD, Participatory Web and User-
Created Content (OECD Publishing, 2007). 
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What significantly differentiates it from popular culture is that participatory culture, by its 
very nature, is a “Read/Write culture”.65 Popular culture is brought about and raised by mass 
media that is specifically envisioned and designed to reach a very large audience.  The 
products of mass media such as books, newspapers, television, radio and broadcasting are 
received and passively read or watched by their consumer (reader and audience). The 
popular culture, especially before the digital age, is characterized as being a “Read-Only 
culture”. As Professor Lessig has pointed out, the world of media from the 20th century is 
read-only; however, in the 21st century it could be both read and write.66 
It is read-only because the mass media technology is primarily targeted at passive recipients 
of culture. Furthermore, it is read-only because it is, meanwhile, a permission culture. Such 
a culture was spawned in a society in which copyright monopoly over creative cultural works 
is so pervasive and copyright restrictions are enforced to the extent that most re-use of 
cultural elements and re-creation are subject to ‘the permission of the powerful, or of creators 
from the past’.67 
On the contrary, read/write culture is a culture in which creativity based on the past is 
allowed and encouraged. Such a culture is, by default, permissive of efforts to re-use, improve 
upon, modify, integrate and remix the existing creative works and cultural elements. 
Read/write culture is a participatory medium, far larger and it certainly involves more people, 
but can also be economically larger.68 
Likewise, it is read/write because media technology nowadays has become practically 
interactive and had made culture extremely amendable, modifiable and manipulable. This 
media technology is represented by the Internet and emerging participative web. It 
empowers users to modify, remix and manipulate the cultural objects they have received and 
thus create their own versions. In the area of music creation, this process is called 
“versioning” which is at the heart of reggae, jazz, blues, rap, r&b, calypso, soca, salsa, Afro-
Cuban and so on. 69  In addition, it is read/write because in practice such modification, 
remixing and manipulation are tolerated, permitted and even welcomed by copyright owners 
in many instances, for example, the creation of fan fictions has been tolerated in many cases, 
and moreover, many copyright owners have utilized open access licences to grant users and 
downstream creators the right to reproduce and modify their copyright works. However, as 
this thesis will demonstrate in the following chapters, in many other cases, these copyright 
owners’ tolerance and permission still cannot satisfy the needs of users and downstream 
creators and therefore stifle creativity in this networked information society for the long run. 
 
                                                     
65 The terms and ideas of “Read-Only culture”, “Read/Write culture”, “remix culture” and “free culture” have been 
demonstrated by professor Lessig on many occasions. Here are two talks given by Lessig: Ted Talk: How creativity is 
being strangled by the law 
<http://www.ted.com/index.php/talks/larry_lessig_says_the_law_is_strangling_creativity.html> at 21 September 
2008; and Final Free Cuture Talk at Stanford University <http://blip.tv/file/get/Esfwork-
LawrenceLessigJanuary31st2008StanfordUniversity175.mov> at 21 September 2008. 
66 Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control 
Creativity (2004) 37. 
67 Ibid, xiv. 
68 Lawrence Lessig, The Read-Write Society (a talk at Wizards of OS4, 2006), download the video and audio of this 
talk here <http://www.wizards-of-os.org/programm/live_stream.html> at 21 September 2008. You also can read a 
brief script of this talk here <http://lwn.net/Articles/199877/> at 21 September 2008. 
69 On the notion of “versioning” in music creation, see Dick Hebdige, Cut ’N’ Mix: Culture, Identity and Caribbean Music (1987). 
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b) Everyday Creativity vs. Eminent Creativity 
Creativity plays a role in many of our everyday activities and in each of our lives, and ‘it does 
so very frequently’.70 However, ‘there is a debate about this, with some scholars focusing on 
eminent or unambiguous rather than everyday creativity’.71 But now it suffices to say that 
‘creativity is a potential each of us shares and a talent each of us should employ, probably 
every day’.72 
The subjects of studies of eminent creativity are “eminent creators”. Eminent creators are 
‘those well-known individuals who have received widespread public acclaim for their 
contributions to society’.73 And these are ‘the people who have had an impact on our lives, 
who have made a difference’.74 Biological perspectives on creativity have raised the question: 
do exceptional or eminent creators have genes or brains or something that the rest of us do 
not? 75 Research has found that ‘brain provides humans with a productive, proactive, and 
generative mind’.76 And also it has come to confirm the assumptions that the human brain 
supports different kinds of creativity and different human brains lead to different kinds of 
creativity.77 
Departing from the “Greek myth of the Muses” and “ancient theory” that regard creativity as 
a gift of the gods 78  and the Romantic notion that views creativity mysterious, 79  an 
unromantic notion on creativity has become prevalent, especially with the popular 
application of the Internet and associated technology. It has articulated the idea that 
everyone is creative and creativity can be seen everywhere in our daily life. 
Everyday creativity is regarded as ‘the originality of everyday life, the doing of something 
new in the course of one’s activity at work or at leisure.’80 It is further defined that everyday 
creativity is about ‘making an original contribution of some sort, and one that communicates 
to others and is thus meaningful, rather than being random or idiosyncratic.’81 Richards 
reminds us that everyday creativity is a fundamental survival capability and it ‘is about 
everyone, throughout our lives, and fundamental to our very survival. It is how we find our 
lost child, get enough to eat, make our way in a new place and culture’.82 
It has also been noted that the focus on exceptional or “genius” level creators can ‘lead one to 
associate “true” creativity with privileged populations representing only a small segment of 
society, rather than with the very wide range of people who actually can (and do) 
                                                     
70 Mark A. Runco, Creativity: Theories and Themes (2006) x. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Mark A. Runco and Ruth Richards, Eminent Creativity, Everyday Creativity, and Health (Ablex Publishing 
Corporation, 1997) 3. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Mark A. Runco, Creativity: Theories and Themes (2006), 73. 
76 Ibid, 108. 
77 Ibid. 
78 This view still remains influential in our culture today, especially as far as the arts are concerned. See further, Michael Kelly (ed.) 
Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, Vol. 1 (1998) 456-457. 
79 Ibid 457-458. 
80 Mark A. Runco and Ruth Richards, Eminent Creativity, Everyday Creativity, and Health (Ablex Publishing 
Corporation, 1997) 97. 
81 Ruth Richards, ‘Everyday Creativity and the Arts’ (2007) 63 (7) World Futures: Journal of General Evolution, 502 
– 523. 
82 Ruth Richards (ed), Everyday creativity and new views of human nature: psychological, social, and spiritual 
perspectives (2007). 
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contribute’.83 ‘Fortunately,’ Richards continues, ‘we are now entering an age of increased 
artistic awareness’ and it is the time to ‘promote a new artistic literacy in the population at 
large − in the schools and in society at large − for personal fulfillment, growth, and deeper 
meaning, for the fullest education in all domains of knowledge, for effectiveness in our 
communities, and perhaps even for our ultimate survival in a complex and increasingly 
threatened world.’84 
c) Decentering Situated Creativity 
More recently, with the democratisation of technologies for content creation and 
dissemination, concerns about commons-based peer production and associated everyday 
creativity or so-called “vernacular creativity”85 have arose from many fields such as cultural, 
social and economic studies.86 The increasing ‘availability and power of digital technologies, 
combined with the Internet, allow every to be a media participant, if not producer’.87 As a 
result, everyday creativity is being ‘remediated in new media contexts in specific ways’, and 
most notably, the process of remediation ‘are clearly not one-way, but dialectical’.88 Therefore, 
from the perspective of the popularity of remediated everyday creativity, creativity has 
become decentering, democratized and more situated.89 
III. CREATIVITY AND COPYRIGHT 
The relationship between copyright, creativity and public interest has always been arguable. 
Seemingly, the law declares the primary purpose of copyright is to promote culture and 
public interest through incentives to creativity. For instance, the full title of the first 
copyright act, British Statute of Anne 1710,90 states that it is ‘An Act for the Encouragement 
of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such 
Copies, during the Times therein mentioned’. 91  To some copyright scholars, the title itself 
                                                     
83 Ruth Richards, ‘Everyday Creativity and the Arts’ (2007) 63 (7) World Futures: Journal of General Evolution, 500 
– 501. 
84 Ibid 501. 
85 ‘The idea of “vernacular creativity” is a centre of gravity in relation to new configurations of the aesthetic and the 
social that are most sharply realized in the context of new media.’ See further, Jean Burgess, ‘Vernacular Creativity 
and New Media’ (PhD thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2007) 29 <http://adt.library.qut.edu.au/adt-
qut/public/adt-QUT20070727.112603/> at 22 September 2008. 
86 See generally, Eric Von Hippel, Democratizing Innovation (2005); Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Network: How 
Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom (2006); Jean Burgess, ‘Vernacular Creativity and New Media’ 
(PhD thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2007) <http://adt.library.qut.edu.au/adt-qut/public/adt-
QUT20070727.112603/> at 22 September 2008. 
87 Jean Burgess, ‘Vernacular Creativity and New Media’ (PhD thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2007) 2 
<http://adt.library.qut.edu.au/adt-qut/public/adt-QUT20070727.112603/> at 22 September 2008. 
88 Ibid, 74. 
89 See further, Julie E. Cohen, ‘Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory’, (2007) 40 UC Davis Law Review 1177-
1192. 
90 The Statute of Anne is the short title of “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the 
Authors or purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned”. It was the first copyright law in the Kingdom of Great 
Britain, enacted in 1709 and entering into force on April 10, 1710. ‘Despite its failures’, Harry Ransom commented, it successfully 
introduced further developments in literary property, such as ‘a general acceptance of the author as the source of property rights in 
literature and an increase in the rewards of authorship’.  See Harry Ransom, The First Copyright Statute: An Essay on An Act for the 
Encourage of Learning, 1710 (University of Texas Press, 1956) 105-106. 
91 Harry Ransom, The First Copyright Statute: An Essay on An Act for the Encourage of Learning, 1710 (University 
of Texas Press, 1956), 3.  
  
 
 The Place of Creativity in Copyright Law 
12 
already suffices it to say that the ultimate purpose of copyright is to benefit the public 
through stimulating creativity.92  
However, other arguments are doubtful of the above proposition, with debates that copyright 
is first and foremost a right of authors and the primary function of the law is to raise 
protection for creative expressions93 and thus generates proprietary rights for creators.94 
Moreover, even if copyright purposes to promote creativity and culture, however, actually 
how? Does copyright really stimulate but not stifle creativity? 
A. Creativity and the Purpose of Copyright Law  
The popular open online encyclopedia Wikipedia explains ‘[the] purpose of copyright law is to 
stimulate the creation of as many works of art, literature, music, and other “works of 
authorship” as possible, in order to benefit the public.’95 However, there is a debate about 
this proposition, with some people arguing that they cannot find one piece in the legislation 
supporting the notion that the intent or design of copyright law is to benefit the public rather 
than to protect the author. 
a) Contextual Investigation 
After the literary property debate in late 18th century,96 the court has made it very clear that 
copyright is not a natural right; instead it is a legal right granted by statute. However, the 
ensuing question is why the law confers such a set of monopoly right on the author? The 
paths paved to answer this question and thus to justify the granting of copyright could be 
classified in many ways. For example, these arguments may be classed as utilitarian 
(copyright provides an incentive for the creation and dissemination of works) and non-
utilitarian (the author simply deserve recompense for their contribution);97  and another 
classification is: (a) natural justice arguments; (b) creative incentive arguments; (c) general 
public interest arguments; (d) social contract arguments; (e) moral arguments.98 
It has been reiterated for centuries in many cases and laws that ‘the primary object in 
conferring the rights associated with copyright lies in the general benefits derived by the 
                                                     
92 See generally, L. Ray Patterson and Stanley W. Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright: A Law of User’s Right (The 
University of Georgia Press, 1991); Harry Ransom, The First Copyright Statute: An Essay on An Act for the 
Encourage of Learning, 1710 (University of Texas Press, 1956); Ronan Deazley, On the Origin of the Right to Copy: 
Creating the Movement of Copyright Law in Eighteenth-Century Britain (1695 – 1775) (Hart Publishing, 2004). 
93 For example, some writers suggests, ‘[t]he object of copyright is the protection of “works”; that is intellectual creations in the field 
of literature, music, art and science.’ See further, Edward W. Ploman and L. Clark Hamilton, Copyright: Intellectual Property in the 
Information Age (1980) 31. 
94 This is believed to be a misunderstanding about copyright and therefore it is the dark side of copyright. ‘Modern-
day copyright harbors a dark side. The misunderstanding held by many who believe that the primary purpose of 
copyright law is to protect authors against those who would pilfer the author's work threatens to upset the delicate 
equilibrium in copyright law. This misunderstanding obviously works to the benefit of the content owning industries, 
such as the publishing industry, the music and motion picture industries, and the computer software industry. This 
fundamental misunderstanding is perpetuated by the stern FBI warnings at the beginning of video tapes, by overly 
broad assertions of the rights in the copyright notices, and by the general lack of public discourse about the balance 
required in copyright law if copyright is to fulfill its constitutionally mandated goal of promoting knowledge and 
learning.’ Lydia Pallas Loren, ‘The Purpose of Copyright’, (2000) 2 (1) Open Spaces Quarterly <http://www.open-
spaces.com/article-v2n1-loren.php> at 25 September 2008. 
95 Wikipedia, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_copyright_law#Scope_of_copyright_law>, at 8 September 
2008. 
96 See further, Stephen Parks (ed), The Literary Property Debate: Six Tracts 1764-1774 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1975); see 
also Rocque Reynolds and Natalie Stoianoff, Intellectual Property: Text and Essential Cases (2008) 6-12. 
97 See further, Stewart E. Sterk, ‘Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law’ (1996) 94 Michigan Law Review1197-1249. See also David 
McGowan, ‘Copyright Nonconsequentialism’ (2004) 69 (1) Missouri Law Review 1-117. 
98 See further, J.A.L. Sterling, World Copyright Law (2003) 61-70. 
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public from the labours of authors; the rights are given by the public in exchange for the 
benefits bestowed by the genius and skill of individuals and as an incentive to encourage 
such efforts’.99 This theme has even being explicitly stated in many laws about copyright in a 
variety of national and international legislation. For example, the contracting parties of WCT 
explicitly declare to emphasize ‘the outstanding significance of copyright protection as an 
incentive for literary and artistic creation’100  
Moreover, the Article 1 of copyright law of China says, ‘[t]his law is enacted … for the 
purpose of protecting the copyright of authors…encouraging the creation and dissemination 
of works…, and promoting the progress and flourishing of socialist culture and sciences.’101 
Copyright Act of South Korea says, ‘Article 1 (Purpose): The purpose of this Act is to protect 
the rights of authors and the rights neighboring on them and to promote fair use of works in 
order to contribute to the improvement and development of culture’.102 Copyright Law of 
Japan also says, ‘[t]he purpose of this Law is, by providing for the rights of authors and the 
rights neighboring thereon with respect to works as well as performances, phonograms, 
broadcasts and wire diffusions, to secure the protection of the rights of authors, etc., having 
regard to a just and fair exploitation of these cultural products, and thereby to contribute to 
the development of culture.’103 
The Article I Section 8 of U.S. Constitution claims, ‘[the] Congress shall have power … [to] 
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries’. Similarly, it is 
believed that the constitutional statement is fairly clear that copyright law’s actual end goal 
is to promote learning and creativity but not to protect authors.104 To pursue the intention 
and purpose of the Constitution, the Supreme Court of U.S. has produced many opinions. In 
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the Court claims, ‘[t]he primary 
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but “to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts”. To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original 
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by 
a work.’105 The theme in the Feist case is reiterated by the Supreme Court three years later. 
                                                     
99 John S. McKeown, Fox Canadian Law of Copyright and Industrial Design (3rd ed, 2000) 3. 
100 WIPO Copyright Treaty (adopted in Geneva on December 20, 1996) <http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html> 
at 27 September 2008. 
101 Copyright Law of People’s Republic of China  (Enacted in 1990 and Revised in 2001) 
<http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/relatedlaws/200204/t20020416_34754.htm> at 27 September 2008. 
102 Copyright Act of South Korea (Revised 2004) <http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Copyright_Act_of_South_Korea> at 27 September 
2008. 
103 See Article 1 of Copyright Law of Japan (Revised 2006)<http://www.cric.or.jp/cric_e/clj/index.html> at 27 September 2008. 
104 See further the purpose of U.S. copyright law, Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 
(2002) §1.03. These propositions are so widely accepted that the following statements are very typical writings about 
the purpose of copyright law, especially in U.S.:  ‘In the long term, however, the purpose of copyright law is to 
promote learning and creativity.’ See the University of Delaware, ‘What is the purpose of copyright law?’ 
<http://www.udel.edu/topics/techtalk/1998/March/purpose.html> at 25 September 2008. In a copyright tutorial 
design by the BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY to educate its faculty, staff and students about copyright law how 
it relates to them, it is claimed, ‘The primary purpose of copyright law is not so much to protect the interests of the 
authors/creators, but rather to promote the progress of science and the useful arts —that is — knowledge. To 
accomplish this purpose, copyright ownership encourages authors/creators in their efforts by granting them a 
temporary monopoly, or ownership of exclusive rights for a specified length of time. However, this monopoly is 
somewhat limited when it conflicts with an overriding public interest, such as encouraging new creative and 
intellectual works, or the necessity for some members of the public to make a single copy of a work for non profit, 
educational purposes.’ See BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
<http://www.lib.byu.edu/departs/copyright/tutorial/module1/page3.ht > at 25 September 2008. 
105 499 U.S. 340 (1991) 
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In Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., the Supreme Court of U.S. admits that copyright law ‘reflects a 
balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and 
rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public 
availability of literature, music, and the other arts’. Therefore, it asserts that ‘[t]he 
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an “author's” creative 
labor’. ‘But,’ it continues, ‘the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic 
creativity for the general public good.’ 106 
The opinions which suggest that the primary purpose of copyright is to advance public 
welfare and further see reward to the author as ‘a second consideration’ could be traced back 
to many earlier Supreme Court’s cases. For example, in Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 107 Chief 
Justice Hughes said ‘[the] sole interest of the United States and the primary object in 
conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the 
labors of authors. A copyright, like a patent, is “at once the equivalent given by the public for 
benefits bestowed by the genius and meditations and skill of individuals, and the incentive to 
further efforts for the same important objects”’. In U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 108 the 
Court explicitly pointed out, ‘[the] copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to 
the owner a secondary consideration.’ Additionally, this statement was repeated by the Court 
years later in Mazer v. Stein.109  
b) Is it just a Myth? 
The theory about the purpose of copyright law could be articulated as following: The primary 
objective (ultimate aim) is to ‘promote the progress of science and useful arts’ through 
rewarding the creator with limited proprietary rights on their creations. However, it has 
been correctly pointed out that this theory followed by the above legislation and cases has 
dissolved into mythology.110 It is full of paradoxes and myths as David Vaver suggested: Is 
copyright designed to protect authors? Does copyright law encourage art and literature? Does 
copyright law encourage dissemination of works?111 
The “primary objective/ultimate aim – immediate effect” approach that has been adopted by 
the Court and followed by legislation is, indeed, very arguable as it does not actually and 
explicitly set up a priority rule while “assure author’s right”/“stimulate artistic creativity” 
and “promote the progress”/“public good” are competing against each other. Law is regulation; 
so is copyright law. It is easy to see that copyright law regulates the acts of creating and 
disseminating of creative expressions, the outputs of creativity. However, regulating is not 
easy, especially when it intervene in conflicting interests. 
First of all, if the reward offered by the law for the author fails to stimulate creativity, could 
copyright be abolished? Although copyright owners may waive their rights by means of 
explicit contractual statement, the law by default thrusts a set of exclusive rights upon the 
author without considering the variety of their personal preferences. For example, in many 
cases, the creation and production of intellectual and artistic content are not motivated by 
pursuit of economic interest but by many other factors such as reputation, desire for 
                                                     
106 510 U.S. 517 (1994) 
107 286 U.S. 123 (1932) 
108 334 U.S. 131 (1948) 
109 347 U.S. 201 (1954) 
110 See further, David Vaver, ‘Intellectual Property Today: of Myths and Paradoxes’ (1990) 69 (1) Canadian Bar Review 98-128. 
111 Ibid. 
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communication and just a gift-giving. As a result, the rise of open access licensing in the past 
years could be regarded as an attempt to offer creators a negotiable institutional 
arrangement that has been overlooked by copyright law. 
Secondly, the progress of science and useful arts ‘can be promoted in various ways, not solely 
through incentives for new creation’.112 The incentive raised by the law is at many social 
costs, such as the cost for judicial enforcement and the restricted public access to information 
and knowledge. ‘Like patents’, it is suggested, ‘copyrights impose a deadweight social cost in 
the form of lost opportunities to use a public good: the expressions protected by the Copyright 
Act.’113 Many people view copyright laws as restrictions on what they can do with someone 
else's creative work. As copyright expert Kenneth Crewes pointed out, copyright law 
‘promotes creativity and publication, while inhibiting research and learning’.114  
Thirdly, to the very end, the Court does not say whose interest should prevail if ‘reward the 
labor of authors’ is immediately in conflict with ‘public good’. This conflict is very real as 
Macaulay stated that copyright was ‘a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to 
writers’.115 Copyright law tries to harmonize these conflicting interests;116 thus it carefully 
balances ‘property rights that gives author and their publishers sufficient inducements to 
produce and disseminate’117 original works and meanwhile allows ‘others to draw on these 
works in their own creative and educational endeavors’.118  However, nowadays it has been 
complained that in the real world there is no longer any meaningful balance between the 
rights of the creator (actually major media conglomerates) and the rights of the public. The 
industries have many lobbies to which the increasingly expanding scope of copyright 
protection should ascribe;119 however, as professor Lessig appealed on many occasions, the 
pubic don’t have one yet. Nevertheless, although already seeing there is an apparent conflict 
between the public interest and the interest of copyright owner, some scholars yet argues, 
‘the reality seems to be that any conflict is more imaginary than real’.120 Moreover, recently 
commentator suggested that ‘both public theory and empirical evidence suggest that some 
                                                     
112 Shira Perlmutter, ‘Participation in the International Copyright System as a Means to Promote the Progress of 
Science and Useful Atrs’ (2002) 36 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 324. 
113 Tom W. Bell, ‘Prediction Markets for Promoting the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts’ (2006) 14 (1) George Mason Law 
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114 Cited in Dickinson, Dennis, ‘Copyright Dilemma: The Need for Local Policy’ (1996) 16 (4) Library Issues 1. 
115 This statement ‘reveals the conflict of interest between the reader and the book producer’. See Stephen Breyer, ‘The Uneasy Case 
for Copyright: a Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs’ (1970) 84 (2) Harvard Law Review 281. 
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Law (2003) 95. 
117 Paul Goldstein, ‘Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice (vol. 1)’ (1989) 4-9. 
118 Ibid. 
119 As  Loren complained, ‘[from] increasing the basic term of a copyright to increasing the types of activities that a copyright owner 
can control, copyright law has evolved into a profit maximizing tool for the powerful content industry’. See Lydia Pallas Loren, 
‘Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The evolution of criminal 
copyright infringement and the importance of the willfulness requirement’ (1999) 77 (3) Washington University 
Law Quarterly 838-839. Tom Bell also pointed out that the record of expansion of copyright law under the influence of special 
interests ‘proves worrying enough’. See Tom W. Bell, ‘Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection 
of Expressive Works’ (2001) 69 University of Cincinnati Law Review 786-787. 
120 Gillian Davies, Copyright and the Public Interest (2nd ed., Seet & Maxwell Ltd., 2002) 354. 
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types of intellectual property [especially copyright] legislation may be prone to excessive 
private-interest influence, or rent-seeking’.121 
In addition, the Court says that creative work should be encouraged and rewarded; and it is 
accomplished by the means of securing ‘a fair return for an author’s creative labor’. However, 
two further problems remain. Firstly, would ‘a fair return’ be capable of getting the author 
‘encouraged and rewarded’? The most notable ‘fair return’ offered by the law is economic 
potentials that, in many cases, could only be achieved through the intermediation of media 
conglomerates. However, in practice, economic return received by the author is extremely up 
to the discretion of these greedy media companies. Secondly, how much return is ‘fair’ so that 
incentive would be sufficient? Would copyright protection term of life plus 50 years be ‘fair’ 
enough? Obviously, U.S. Congressman Sonny Bono, Mickey Mouse and their supporters did 
not think so. As a result, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (Sonny Bono Act) 
extended the term to life of the author plus 70 years and for works of corporate authorship to 
120 years after creation or 95 years after publication, whichever endpoint is earlier.122 
Likewise, The European Commission did not think so as well. In July 2008, the Commission 
adopted a proposal to extend the term of protection for performers and sound recordings to 
95 years.123 ‘It is difficult to see how these endless copyright terms “promote the progress of 
science and useful arts.”’, critics argue, ‘[it] is not so difficult, especially for librarians, to see 
how they retard that progress.’124 
It has been proposed by copyright advocates since the birth of modern copyright law that 
copyright is an incentive which stimulates production of more creative works and it would 
thus eventually benefit the public. Therefore, copyright law ultimately serves the public 
instead of individual creators. However, this proposition is not perfectly convincing till today. 
To this end, some scholars have turned to the historical context of the invention of this 
existing copyright framework. For instance, after re-examining the history of the Statute of 
Ann and its following cases and legal movements, Ronan Deazley concludes, copyright law 
‘was primarily defined and justified in the interests of society and not the individual’, and 
moreover ‘copyright was fundamentally concerned with the reading public, with the 
encouragement and spread of education, and with the continued production of useful books. 
In allocating the right to exclusively publish a given literary work, the eighteenth century 
parliamentarians were not concerned primarily with the rights of the individual, but acted in 
the furtherance of these much broader social goals.’125 Although it has been ‘overlooked or 
perhaps ignored in other historical tales of the origin of copyright’, this element of the public 
interest ‘once lay at its very core’.126 
                                                     
121 Robert P. Merges, ‘One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000’ (2000) 88 California Law Review 2236. 
122 U.S. Code Title 17 § 302; See also Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d105:s.00505:> at 25 September 2008. 
123 European Commission, Proposal for a European Parliament AND Council Directive amending Directive 2006/116/EC of the 
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124 John N. Berry, ‘The Real Purpose of Copyright’ (7/1/2000) Library Journal 
<http://www.libraryjournal.com/article/CA158872.html> at 25 September 2008. 
125 Ronan Deazley, On the Origin of the Right to Copy: Creating the Movement of Copyright Law in Eighteenth-
Century Britain (1695 – 1775) (Hart Publishing, 2004) 226. 
126 Ibid. 
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c) Articulate the Purpose of Copyright for a Networked Information 
Society 
The problem regarding the purpose of copyright law is important. It is important not only 
because it is the starting and ending point of copyright, but also because it needs to be re-
examined and re-calibrated with its changing social context. What was concerned by the age 
when modern copyright law was invented was the growing reading public. However, the 
public today are different. Nowadays, they are not just reading; however, they are listening 
(to music and sounds of any sort), watching (movies, pictures and other kind of videos), and 
most prevalently they are playing with/in them. The traditional definition of literacy is 
considered to be the ability to read and write. However, in this networked information 
society, the public literacy gains many facets and many dimensions. Accordingly, the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has defined “literacy” 
as ‘the ability to identify, understand, interpret, create, communicate, compute and use 
printed and written materials associated with varying contexts.’ 127  Moreover, literacy 
‘involves a continuum of learning to enable an individual to achieve his or her goals, to 
develop his or her knowledge and potential, and to participate fully in the wider society.’128 
The networked information society affords a wide variety of possibilities for its people to 
enhance their literacy, and to grow up and play with creativity. Copyright law should help 
people to harness these possibilities. The affordance and potential of these possibilities can 
be seen from the rise of the participatory culture and associated democratization of creativity. 
However, the question is whether copyright law is really relevant to and capable of affording 
such assistance. The answer, from my point of view, is positive. 
Through optimizing literary and artistic creativity, copyright law could promote the 
production and availability of creative works. The growth of population may and may not 
lead to an increase in the number of potential authors and thus an increase in the number of 
potential works.129 But, copyright law is in the position to encourage existing authors or 
potential authors to create more works by the means of rewarding their creation.  
Meanwhile, the increase in number of works, as cultural raw materials, contributes to 
educate and transfer more people into qualified potential authors. The use and reuse of 
creative works not only offer something that future creation could immediately built on; but 
also contribute something as experience, knowledge, information and taste to the 
enhancement of individual’s creativity.  To this end, copyright, on one hand, provides 
incentives to motivate and stimulate creativity in producing more works (if possible). On the 
other hand, copyright contribute knowledge, information, and cultural and artistic materials, 
environment and experiences to the enhancement and cultivation of creativity of the public. 
To accomplish its mission, copyright law must maintain a balance between the interest 
arising from stimulus to creativity in production and the interest deriving from use and 
reuse of creative works (products) which contributes to the enhancement of creativity of the 
public. From the point of view of John Howkins, both interests are relevant to the public 
                                                     
127 The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), The Plurality of Literacy and its Implications 
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128 Ibid. 
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interest. The former one is expressed in private property and the later one is expressed in a 
public domain.130 To strike this balance, the existing copyright law, on one hand, confers a 
set of exclusive rights on the author; it, on the other hand, put limitations of some sort on 
these rights (“rights plus limitations” approach). This approach was workable and was 
unlikely to cause unjust situation when the law stayed away from end user’s consumptive 
use of copyrighted materials and their daily life. In fact, ‘copyright was not meant to be used 
in the private sphere’131 of end users and it is ‘evidenced by the fact that exceptions and 
limitations to copyright were also written in the days of the professional intermediary as 
user.’132 However, while copyright law, more and more often, comes to intervene in end user’s 
private sphere and its enforcement becomes so pervasive in people’s everyday life, the “rights 
plus limitations” approach is becoming problematic. The “digital dilemma”133 is increasingly 
real with the unstoppable growth of the tension between copyright owners and users.  
To sum up, in a networked information society, copyright should purpose to optimize the 
creativity of people (authors and users of copyrighted materials) and meanwhile promote 
public literacy. To accomplish this aim, copyright law must balance the interests between 
authors and users while stimulating creativity through rewarding creation and enhancing 
creativity through encouraging use and re-use of creative works. As this thesis will suggest 
and demonstrate, this balance could only be struck through a proper allocation of rights 
between authors and users. 
B. Copyright, and Incentives to and Enhancement of Creativity 
As being questioned both by people inside and outside law, ‘how do you appropriately reward 
something as intangible and subjective as “creativity”?’134 Copyright was born as the result of 
an endeavor to provide solutions. Whether this attempt is effective and successful or not 
needs comprehensive examination with its changing social context. But, empirical analysis 
suggests that ‘protection of the rights of the creator … has been shown to favour creativity, 
and ultimately, therefore, to be of more benefit to the consuming public than if there were no 
rewards based on copyright’.135  
a) Rewards, Stimulus and Enhancement of Creativity 
Creativity can ‘be brought out or cultivated, or encouraged’ from the point of view of both the 
“Romantics” who see creativity mysterious and the “scientific investigators” who see 
creativity explicable and not mysterious.136 The belief that creativity could not be enhanced 
was so widespread in history; however, this perception has changed slightly over the past 20 
                                                     
130 John Howkins pointed out, ‘… intellectual property has been described as being a balance between the public domain and private 
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furthermore, he defines the public interest as ‘optimising creativity.’ See John Howkins, ‘Is it Possible to Balance Creativity and 
Commerce?’ in Fiona Macmillan (ed), New Directions in Copyright Law, Vol. 2 (Edward Elgar, 2006)  311. 
131 Daniel J. Gervais, ‘The Purpose of Copyright Law in Canada’ (2005) 2 (2) University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal, 329. 
132 Ibid. 
133 See further, Committee on Intellectual Property Rights in the Emerging Information Infrastructure, National Research Council, The 
Digital Dilemma: Intellectual Property in the Information Age (2000). 
134 Katherine A. Lawrence, ‘Why be Creative? Motivation and Copyright Law in a Digital Era’ (2004) 1 (2) IP Central. Review 
<http://www.ipcentral.info/review/v1n2lawrence.html> at 29 September 2008. 
135 Gillian Davies, Copyright and the Public Interest (2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 2002) 354-355. 
136 Michael Kelly (Chief ed), Encyclopedia of Aesthetics (vol. 1) (1998) 458. 
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years.137 Many researchers have argued that creativity could be enhanced through training 
and anyone with normal cognitive abilities could reasonably aspire to produce work that is 
creative to some degree in some domain.138 When an attempt is made to enhance creativity, 
‘the multifaceted nature of creativity must be recognized with its cognitive, affective, 
attitudinal, interpersonal and environmental components’.139 
Many variables including abilities, interests, attitudes, motivation, general intelligence, 
knowledge, skills, habits, beliefs, values and cognitive styles are believed to play some role in 
determining how creative a person could be.140 Therefore, some strategies are proposed to 
foster creativity, for example, establishing purpose and intention, encouraging acquisitions of 
domain-specific-knowledge, building basic skills, stimulating and rewarding curiosity and 
exploration, provide motivation (especially internal motivation), providing opportunities for 
choice and discovery and so on.141 
It is extremely notable that motivation that is internally generated (internal or intrinsic 
motivation) is more effective determinant of creativity than that which comes from source 
outside oneself (external or extrinsic motivation).142 Furthermore, some research claimed 
that external motivation, such as rewards and external incentives, could actually undermine 
creativity under certain conditions. 143  Therefore, it is suggested that the structure of 
incentives is very important in determining the nature of creative output.144 
b) Copyright and Enhancement of Creativity 
As already articulated supra, the enhancement of creativity of the public is one key purpose 
of copyright law. Copyright law is designed to achieve this goal through increasing the 
availability of creative works. 
In a society dominated by mass media, such creative works are in most cases available to 
individual end users as cultural and information products (books, CDs, DVDs, films, motion 
pictures, photos, paintings, video games and so on). These products play a crucial role in 
enhancing the creativity of the public with the possibilities allowed by copyright law and 
copyright owners. For example, people may use these products for the purpose of study, 
research, education, learning, enjoyment, reviewing and commenting under the rule of 
“personal use” and “fair use”. Meanwhile, this is also a cultural experience and a process of 
being transformed into civilized and educated citizens sharing common sense of merits and 
vales with the given society within which they are situated. In this way, user’s knowledge, 
skills, general intelligence, abilities might be increased and cumulated; and their interests, 
attitudes, beliefs, values and taste might be shaped and developed. Additionally, the current 
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legal framework also allows users (potential authors) to create new works based on existing 
creations under a certain conditions.  
However, it has been correctly pointed out that the current legal framework merely allows a 
Read-Only culture within which creativity could only be enhanced through “reading”. But, 
just like the learning of swimming could not be accomplished by watching; doing it with and 
by his/her hands is much more effective and desirable. Likewise, the most effective way to 
enhance creativity is allowing and encouraging people to do creative things. Nowadays, the 
advance of technologies affords increasing varieties of possibilities to enable users (potential 
authors) to “write” culture of their own versions rather than merely “read” culture. However, 
these promising possibilities are impeded by the current legal framework. In this sense, the 
current copyright law stifles creativity. 
For example, after interviewing many teachers and makers of media literacy curriculum 
materials, it is complained that the fundamental goals of media education today are 
compromised by unnecessary copyright restrictions and lack of understanding about 
copyright law.145 Another recent study identifies nine common kinds of re-appropriation 
practices in online videos, including parody and satire, negative or critical commentary, 
positive commentary, quoting to trigger discussion, illustration or example, incidental use, 
personal reportage or diaries, archiving of vulnerable or revealing materials, and pastiche or 
collage.146 This study shows that ‘a significant set of creative practices is potentially both 
legal and at risk of curtailment by currently discussed ways to control online piracy and theft 
of copyrighted works’.147 
c) Copyright and Incentives to Creativity 
Similarly, as discussed supra, another key purpose of copyright legislation is to stimulate 
creativity through rewarding creation. However, rewards don’t always favour creativity; on 
many occasions, they may even be detrimental to creativity. Therefore, the structure of 
incentive afforded by copyright should be investigated extensively. 
Before the birth of modern copyright law, copyright was a right of publishers and it purposed 
to protect publishers’ perpetual ownership on manuscripts that they purchased from writers 
and perpetual rights to reproduce these manuscripts. That system was attacked due to many 
reasons, including appeals from writers to sharing larger proportion of income and 
unfairness caused by the perpetual monopoly. Most importantly, that system is counter-
productivity as ‘publishers could earn money indefinitely without soliciting new material’.148 
As a result, the perpetual ownership was replaced by a set of limited exclusive rights 
conferred on authors who, in practice, will transfer these rights to publishers. The limited 
duration of the rights, in fact, results ‘an incentive for publishers to obtain new pieces of 
                                                     
145 See further, Renee Hobbs, Peter Jaszi & Pat Aufderheide, The Cost of Copyright Confusion for Media Literacy (September 2007) 
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literature, and likewise authors had an incentive to create new sources of income for 
themselves when their copyrights expired’.149  
However, copyright’s capability of stimulating creativity and thereafter enhancing public 
interest was, in fact, not self-evident and not without question in the first place. In fact, 
today still can see many doubts questioning the social benefits generated by copyright law. 
The factual basis and empirical evidence for asserting the desired incentive effect of 
copyright is ambivalent and is ‘not easy to assess, as comparatively little empirical work has 
been done on the reasons why people engage in creative activity in the first place, and on the 
role of intellectual property protection in promoting this.’150 As it has been commented, any 
attempt to quantify that copyright generates net public benefits ‘proves difficult, granted’.151 
The truth of the assertion ‘needs careful testing’152 and therefore ‘it is possible that the 
correct answer may differ from case to case.’153 Moreover, many discourses for copyright are 
based on an arguable presumption that ‘the author would not have created the work if she 
had no copyright in it’.154 It is suggested that initial creator or producer may have many 
market advantages of “Lead Time” – being first into the marketplace – even without 
copyright protection available. 155 The claimed needs for the provision of incentives to and 
stimulus for the production of intellectual and artistic works are ‘clearly an economic 
argument that seeks to overcome the public goods character of the products that such 
persons create or originate’.156 But, there are ‘established ways other than copyright to 
compensate authors and creative artists for their efforts’. For example, authors of scholarly 
research and writing are usually employed by universities and institutions and they ‘are 
compensated by their salaries and rarely expect to receive significant royalties’.157 
‘Nonetheless’, although having realized the suspicions discussed above, observers still have 
some confidence as it is stated, ‘copyright does not evidently inflict deep and wide social 
harm’.158 As a matter of fact, copyright, in the past and even today, might be one of the few 
options available for the avoidance of underproduction of creative works in a given society. In 
1783, a committee was appointed by the Continental Congress of U.S. to ‘consider the most 
proper means of cherishing genius and useful arts’. The committee reported that it was 
‘persuaded that nothing is more properly a man’s own than the fruit of his study, and that 
the protection and security of literary property would greatly tend to encourage genius, to 
promote useful discoveries and to the general extension of arts and commerce’.159  
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Actually, from the perspective of a theorist who seeks stimulus to creativity, the grant of 
copyright in creations is prone to inducing and motivating creativity. Compared to 
patronage160 or state funding system161 which directly provides financial support for authors, 
copyright is, indeed, a much more effective mechanism to support creativity. 162  Most 
importantly, copyright empowers authors to be financially independent from patrons or the 
state and live on their own pens (at least theoretically). Such financial independence is of 
significant implications to the liberation and encouragement of creativity as less restraint on 
creation would allow authors and potential authors to develop their own interests, habits and 
intentions.  
Moreover, the incentives afforded by copyright are by its very nature extrinsic, but very 
likely to be internalized and thus to generate intrinsic motivations. As research has 
suggested, rewards and external incentives might undermine creativity; but, under some 
circumstances, they could be transformed to be internal motivations. What the author is 
rewarded by copyright law is not money or direct financial benefits; instead, copyright 
awards the author with autonomy to recoup their expense and effort of creating fixed 
expressive works. 
In addition, copyright law also provides other social supports for creativity. For example, 
such copyright rules as fair use, fair attribution and liability uphold a fair competition 
environment for creation. More significantly, copyright law ensures social attributions and 
recognition for creativity. Associated with many other social norms such as academic 
standards in various domains, values and rules of plagiarism, copyright enable author’s 
creation and contribution to be well attributed and recognized. As theorists have posited, 
‘creative efforts often would go unrecognized without social attributions and recognition’,163 
and very likely ‘some creative people work for that recognition’.164 Furthermore, copyright 
law is also helpful, more or less, to prevent the dark side of creativity.  
Notably, the role in stimulating creativity played by copyright in a given society needs to be 
re-investigated from time to time notwithstanding the incentive effect can be seen more or 
less.  The changing social context within which the creator and user are situated keeps 
challenging the incentive structure and its effectiveness afforded by copyright law. The 
existing copyright legal framework was spawned in a society which was dominated by 
publishing industries (publishers, book dealers and printers). It should not be ignored that 
nowadays the dominant media powers are entertainment industries (recording labels, 
studios, and other multimedia and game producers). What is more, the advance of 
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information and communication technology also empowers both creators and users to 
produce, distribute, use and reuse, share and communicated ideas and creative expressions 
more effectively in increasing dynamic ways. Within such social contexts, it has been 
complained that copyright law works well to provide incentives for entertainment industries 
but not for individual literary and artistic individuals, especially in a networked information 
society.165  
C. Creativity, Originality and Copyrightability 
Copyrightability refers to the conditions of being copyrightable and it determines the creative 
work for which one can obtain copyright and associated legal protection. Within copyright 
law, there are several requirements setting the threshold for copyright protection. For 
example, the work must be fixed in a material form; the work must fall in the categories of 
subject matter of copyright; and most importantly the work must be original.   
The last one is overwhelmingly but controversially relevant to the topic of creativity and 
copyright here. It raises an important issue of what commentators have called the 
“innovation threshold” which means the quantum of innovation or differences from what has 
gone before that is required under copyright law before protection is accorded to the works.166 
This issue has been addressed in a variety of manners in different countries. Although the 
variables might be comparatively slight, they are of significant implications to the 
investigation of the place of creativity in copyright law. 
a) Originality and Copyrightability/Subsistence of Copyright 
In copyright legislation of many countries, it is expressly stated that copyright subsists only 
in so-called “original works”, 167 especially in the cases of literary, dramatic, musical and 
artistic works. 168  But, what constitutes an “original” work? Most copyright legislation 
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deliberately leave this term undefined in order to allow the Court to exercise their discretion. 
For example, in enacting the Copyright Act of 1976, U.S. Congress explained, ‘[the] phrase 
“original works of authorship”, which is purposely left undefined, is intended to incorporate 
without change the standard of originality established by the courts under the present [1909] 
copyright statute.’169 Therefore, any attempt to investigate the rules of originality must turn 
to the courts and decided case law. 
The distinction between the lines followed by U.S. courts and Australian courts is not 
difficult to see.170 The departure is particularly remarkable while the courts are encountered 
with the “sweat of the brow” test. The elements of originality considered by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, especially after Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc.,171 are “independent 
creation” plus “modicum of creativity”;172 however, the prevalent factor considered by the 
courts of Australia is “independent skill or labour” employed to produce the work and 
consequently ‘intellectual creativity is not required’ under Australian law.173 
The rule of “independent creation” could be seen quite consistent through many cases of U.S. 
courts. As Russ VerSteeg commented, ‘[U.S. Courts] have long held that in order for a work 
to be original, it cannot have been copied’.174 For example, in Feist the Court pointed out that 
‘the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other 
works)’.175 A work satisfies the “independent creation” element as long as it was not literally 
copied from another, even if it is fortuitously identical to an existing work. In L. Batlin & 
Son, Inc v. Snyder, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit affirmed that to be 
original, a work must be a product of independent creation which ‘means that the work owes 
its creation to the author and this in turn means that the work must not consist of actual 
copying’.176 In Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Products, Inc. where ‘evidence of independent 
creation was woefully inadequate’, copyright infringement was established.177 In contrast, in 
Don Post Studios v. Cinema Secrets, Inc., the Court held that the work was independently 
created by the defendant, and therefore no copyright infringement was found.178 
On the other hand, whether originality requires an element of creativity was not articulated 
expressly until the Feist case. Prior the Feist, many courts found that a work that exhibits a 
non-trivial variation would satisfy the originality requirement. For example, in Alfred Bell & 
                                                     
169 H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 51 (1976) 
170 The key U.S. cases concerning originality test include, for example, U.S. v. Steffens, U.S. v. Witteman, U.S. v. Johnson (these three 
cases are jointly decided at 100 US 82 (1879)), Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony 111 US 53 (1884), Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co. 188 US 239 (1903), Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951), Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwin Pictures Corp. 81 F.2.d 49 (2nd Cir 1936), Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc. 499 U.S. 340 (1991),. The key UK and 
Anglo-Australian cases are: University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 601, Sands & McDougall Pty 
Ltd v Robinson [1917] HCA 14; (1917) 23 CLR 49, Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 
479, Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 273, Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc (1986) 
161 CLR 171, Data Access Corporation v Powerflex Services Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 49, Desktop Marketing Systems Pty Ltd v. Telstra 
Corporation Ltd [2002] FCAFC 112. 
171 499 U.S. 340 (1991) 
172 ‘The constitutional requirement necessitates independent creation plus a modicum of creativity.’ See further, Feist Pubs., Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) 
173 S Ricketson, The law of Intellectual Property: Copyright, Design & Confidential Information (Lawbook Co., last updated 
September 2008) 7.35. 
174 Russ VerSteeg, ‘Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law’ in Peter K. Yu (ed), Intellectual Property and Information Wealth: 
Issues and Practices in the Digital Age (Vol. 1 Copyright and Related Rights) (2007) 3. 
175 Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) 
176 536 F.2d 486 (2nd Cir. 1976) 
177 930 F.2d 277 (3rd Cir. 1991) 
178 124 F.Supp.2d 311 (E.D. Pa. 2000) 
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Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.,179 the Court stated as follows: ‘All that is needed to satisfy 
both the Constitution and the statute is that the ‘author’ contributed something more than a 
‘merely trivial’ variation, something recognizably ‘his own’. Originality in this context ‘means 
little more than a prohibition of actual copying’. 180(Footnotes omitted) In Feist, the U.S. 
Supreme Court ‘for the first time squarely addressed the issue of the degree of creativity 
necessary to sustain a copyright in a compilation of factual material’.181 The court confirmed 
Professor Nimmer’s proposition by saying: ‘Original, as the term is used in copyright, means 
only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other 
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.’182  
The Feist approach to the subsistence of copyright gives rise to much controversy, even 
within U.S. jurisdiction. It affirms ‘originality is a constitutional requirement’ which arises 
out of the use of the terms “Authors” and “Writings” in the Constitution;183 then it disputably 
‘goes a step further’184 by saying that ‘the component of creativity is also constitutionally 
mandated’.185 However, critics argue that historical evidences make it very clear that the 
formulations of the originality test, prior to the Feist, certainly did not seem to incorporate a 
standard of creativity.186 
The approach taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in Feist on the issue of the level of creativity 
in copyrightability test can be contrasted with that taken by the Full Court of the Federal 
Court of Australia in Desktop Marketing Systems Pty Ltd v. Telstra Corporation Ltd.187 In 
Desktop, a similar issue before the Court is ‘whether the word “original” in s 32 of the 
[Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)] requires the intellectual effort or creative spark on which Feist 
insists’. 188  After reviewing the English legislative and judicial tradition 189  and further 
considering the principle and policy in respect of the Feist approach, the Court asserts ‘the 
                                                     
179 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951) 
180 Ibid. 
181 Howard B. Abrams, ‘Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law’ (1992) 55 (2) Law and Contemporary Problems 5. 
182 Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) 
183 Ibid. 
184 Howard B. Abrams, ‘Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law’ (1992) 55 (2) Law and Contemporary Problems 14. 
185 Ibid. 
186 During arguments leading to the birth of the current U.S. Copyright Act 1976, the U.S. Congress the standard of originality ‘does 
not include requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no intention to enlarge the standard of copyright 
protection to require them.’ See further HR 1496 at 51; S Rep No 473 at 50. Moreover, the U.S. Register of Copyrights was initially of 
the opinion that, to be copyrightable, a work must be original and ‘must represent an appreciable amount of creative authorship’. See 
further Register of Copyrights, Copyright Law Revision, Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. 
Copyright Law, printed for the House of Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong, 1st Sess., at 9 (Committee Print, 1961) But, the 
express requirement of “creativity” was abandoned later. ‘[W]hen it came to drafting, a great deal of concern was expressed about the 
dangers of using a word like “creative” in this context. It was argued that the word might lead courts to establish a higher standard of 
copyrightability than that now existing under the decisions, and that any effort to define “original” could bring about the same 
undesirable result’. See further Supplementary Report of Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the US Copyright Law: 
1965 Revision Bill, House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong 1st Sess 3 (Committee Print, 1965).  
187 [2002] FCAFC 112; (2002) 119 FCR 491 
188 [2002] FCAFC 112, 204. 
189 The Court considered UK and Australian cases both prior to and after Copyright Act 1911 (UK). The pre-1991 cases include 
Matthewson v Stockdale (1806) 12 Ves 270 (33 ER 103), Longman v Winchester (1809) 16 Ves Jun 269 (33 ER 987), Hotten v Arthur 
(1863) 1 H & M 603 (71 ER 264), Scott v Stanford (1867) LR 3 Eq 718, Morris v Ashbee (1868) LR 7 Eq 34, Cox v Land and Water 
Journal Company (1869) LR 9 Eq 324, Morris v Wright (1870) LR 5 Ch App 279, Hogg v Scott (1874) LR 18 Eq 444, Dicks v Yates 
(1881) 18 Ch D 76, Ager v Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co (1884) 26 Ch D 637, Macmillan & Co Ltd v Suresh Chunder 
Deb (1890) 17 I LR (Calc Series) 951, Leslie v J Young & Sons [1894] AC 335, Walter v Lane [1900] AC 539. The following are the 
post-1911 cases considered by the Court: Blacklock & Co Ltd v C Arthur Pearson Ltd [1915] 2 Ch 376, University of London Press 
Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 601, G A Cramp & Sons Ltd v Frank Smythson Ltd [1944] AC 329, Football League 
Ltd v Littlewoods Pools Ltd [1959] Ch 637, Sands & McDougall Pty Ltd v Robinson [1917] HCA 14; (1917) 23 CLR 49; Skybase 
Nominees Pty Ltd v Fortuity Pty Ltd (1996) 36 IPR 529. See further, Desktop Marketing Systems Pty Ltd v. Telstra Corporation Ltd 
[2002] FCAFC 112. 
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course of Anglo-Australian authority recounted earlier shows that it does not’.190  The Court 
furthermore points out that the Feist approach ‘depended on constitutional considerations 
peculiar to the United States’.191 The Court expressly endorses the propositions: ‘The concept 
of originality is correlative with that of authorship’192 and ‘[a]uthorship (likewise originality) 
does not require novelty, inventiveness or creativity, whether of thought or expression, or 
any form of literary merit’.193 In 2003, the High Court of Australia refused to hear the appeal 
the Federal Court’s decision indicating its unwillingness to follow Feist as well.  
It is interesting to see how the Australian courts will build on the Desktop in another recent 
case, Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd v IceTV Pty Ltd in which the key legal focus is on 
substantiality/independent creation tests and copyright infringement. At first instance, the 
Federal Court of Australia rejected Nine’s claim that the weekly version of its TV program 
schedules (“the Weekly Schedule”) were infringed by IceTV’s electronic program guide (“the 
IceGuide”).194 The Court affirmed that Nine’s Weekly Schedule is qualified for copyright 
protection as a compilation; but it further held that IceTV had not copied a substantial part 
of the Weekly Schedule.195 The Court found that IceTV produced the IceGuide through 
independent inquiry196 and therefore it did not infringe copyright in the infringement Weekly 
Schedule.197  However, this decision was reversed on appeal with the Full Court of the 
Federal Court of Australia (notably the same bench that sat on the Desktop case – BLACK 
CJ, LINDGREN & SACKVILLE JJ) finding that when IceTV copied (even indirectly) the 
most important information and substantial part of the Weekly Schedule to produce the 
IceGuide, it was infringing copyright.198 On 26 August 2008, the High Court of Australia, 
surprisingly, granted IceTV special leave to appeal the Full Court’s decision.199 Consequently, 
it is reasonable to believe that the High Court is about to re-examine the substantiality test 
for copyright infringement, especially for factual compilations. 
To sum up, U.S. courts hold that ‘copyright rewards originality, not effort’,200 and accordingly 
U.S. law extend very thin copyright, especially to databases and other compilation of facts. It 
theoretically differentiates U.S. courts’ approach from that of Australian courts.  In terms of 
                                                     
190 Ibid, 204; Furthermore, the court saw alternative approach other than Feist by saying: ‘In view of these matters, the significance of 
Feist for present purposes is whether the reasoning, shorn of issues peculiar to the United States, convincingly establishes a "unitary 
concept of creative originality for copyright law": J C Ginsburg, "No `Sweat'? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of 
Information After Feist v Rural Telephone (1992) 92 Colum L Rev 338, at 341. The opinion shows that the concept of "originality" in 
copyright law is capable of being understood as incorporating a "creative spark" requirement. But this is not the only view that can be 
taken. The English and Australian authorities, to which reference has already been made, demonstrate that the concept of originality 
can equally be understood as embracing a compilation that is the product of substantial labour or expense, provided that it goes 
beyond the mere copying of other works. On this approach, originality does not always involve the "creative spark" identified as 
essential in Feist. This view of originality also accommodates the special characteristics of factual compilations which, by statute, can 
be the subject matter of copyright.’ See ibid, 423. 
191 Ibid, 326. See further debates, ibid 367, 420.  
192 Desktop Marketing Systems Pty Ltd v. Telstra Corporation Ltd, [2002] FCAFC 112, 160. 
193 Ibid. 
194 [2007] FCA 1172 
195 Ibid. 
196 [2007] FCA 1172, 242, 243. 
197 See further [2007] FCA 1172, 243-250. The Court explained as follows: ‘It is at law open to a person to ascertain the facts recorded 
in a compilation by independent inquiry and to compile his or her own compilation containing the results of that inquiry. So long as 
the second compiler does not copy the first compilation, there would be no infringement of any copyright in that compilation.’ See 
[2007] FCA 1172, 120. 
198 [2008] FCAFC 71 
199 See further, AustLII, <http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/other/HCATrans/2008/308.html?query=^IceTV> at 7 October 
2008. 
200 The court further the argument as follows: ‘As this Court noted more than a century ago, “great praise may be due to the plaintiffs 
for their industry and enterprise in publishing this paper, yet the law does not contemplate their being rewarded in this way.” Baker v. 
Selden, 101 U.S., at 105.’ See Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) 
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copyrightability, Australian courts primarily consider the labour, skill and expense (so-called 
“sweat of the brow”) that are employed to produce the work.201 The rationale behind the 
judicial unwillingness to look at the artistic merit of copyrighted works has been suggested 
and summarized by Cohen that copyright theorists ‘are deeply suspicious of the role of value 
judgments about artistic merit in justifying the recognition and allocation of rights.’202 
b) Authorial Contribution and Its Copyrightability 
Given that neither novelty/inventiveness nor even creativity is required, what must emanate 
from the author in order for the work to qualify as ‘copyrightable’? Is something more 
required by way of original authorial contribution than simply the act of giving material 
expression to something? What is the requirement for the contribution that is authorial? 
As discussed supra, the place of creativity in the originality test (and thus in copyrightability 
test) may vary slightly in the copyright laws of different countries. However, the variables 
are so slight that it might be ignorable in practice as even U.S. courts admit ‘the requisite 
level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice’. 203 As a result, ‘the vast 
majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, “no 
matter how crude, humble or obvious” it might be’.204 Moreover, only on occasions when 
copyright protection for databases or factual compilations is at issue205 would the creativity 
paradox become inevasible. It is because copyright has become so pervasive that it is hardly 
possible to see any work that is not copyrightable, especially in the cases of literary, dramatic, 
musical and artistic works. ‘Perhaps’, Professor Abrams commented, ‘the greatest 
importance of Feist rests on a policy perspective. Feist prevents copyright from being used to 
bar public access to facts and data per se, which copyright was never intended to protect.’206 
In desktop, the court agrees ‘[t]he test of originality is whether the work was not copied, but 
originated from the putative author’207 and ‘[t]his test is not an “all or nothing” one but raises 
a question of fact and degree as to the extent of the putative author’s contribution to the 
making of the particular literary work in question’.208 It can be deduced from many courts’ 
opinions that the authorial contribution is the independent application of knowledge, 
                                                     
201 Professor Denicola pointed out as follows: ‘effort of authorship can be effectively encouraged and rewarded only by linking the 
existence and extent of protection to the total labor of production. To focus on the superficial form of the final product to the exclusion 
of the effort expended in collecting the data presented in the work is to ignore the central contribution of the compiler.’ The Court in 
Desktop affirmed this analysis to reflect the policy considerations informing the nineteenth century authorities on copyright in factual 
compilations. See Desktop Marketing Systems Pty Ltd v. Telstra Corporation Ltd, [2002] FCAFC 112, 424; see also Nine Network 
Australia Pty Ltd v IceTV Pty Ltd, [2007] FCA 1172, 46. 
202 Therefore, they have ‘struggled mightily to articulate neutral, process-based models of progress that manage simultaneously to 
avoid enshrining particular criteria of artistic and intellectual merit and to ensure that the “best” artistic and intellectual outputs will 
succeed.’ See further, Julie E. Cohen, ‘Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory’, (2007) 40 UC Davis Law Review, 1162-3. 
203 Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) 
204 Ibid. 
205 Specific issue about databases protection is out of the topic of this article. But, the possible alternatives that can be seen nationally 
and internationally for the issue of database and other forms of factual compilations might be: (a) sui generis protection approach as 
adopted in the Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of 
databases; (b) copyright protection approach as being arguably articulated in Desktop Marketing Systems Pty Ltd v. Telstra 
Corporation Ltd, [2002] FCAFC 112 and Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd v IceTV Pty Ltd, [2007] FCA 1172; (c) public domain: no 
legal protection for those that are not copyrightable as being articulated in Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 
(1991). In terms of collections of literary or artistic works, it is notable that the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works requires creativity in the "selection and arrangement" of the contents as its article 2(5) states, ‘Collections of literary or 
artistic works such as encyclopaedias and anthologies which, by reason of the selection and arrangement of their contents, constitute 
intellectual creations shall be protected as such, without prejudice to the copyright in each of the works forming part of such 
collections.’ 
206 Howard B. Abrams, ‘Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law’ (1992) 55 (2) Law and Contemporary Problems 44. 
207 Marketing Systems Pty Ltd v. Telstra Corporation Ltd, [2002] FCAFC 112, 160. 
208 Ibid. 
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judgment, skill or labour on the part of the author that are represented in the literary or 
artistic expression. 209 Such contribution ‘inevitably involves a mixture of both mental and 
physical operations on the part of the author: decisions, on the one hand, as to how the idea 
or subject of the work is to be expressed, and the execution of these decisions, on the other.’210 
‘Consequently’, as Ricketson commented, ‘“authorship” clearly covers a wide spectrum of 
activities that can result in the production of protected forms of expression. These include the 
acts of selection, compilation, abridgement, transcription, translation, arrangement and 
alteration, as well as the more conventional activities of writing, composition and 
representation’.211 For instance, In Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd v IceTV Pty Ltd, both the 
Courts of first instance and appeal affirm that the sets of skill and labour (of selecting, 
arranging and drafting) exercised in the creation of the Weekly Schedule give rise to the 
subsistence of copyright.212 
Therefore, for this moment, despite of the slight variables, the originality/copyrightability 
test (as well as associated test for copyright infringement) could be summarized as a general 
two step test: Firstly, independent creation/inquiry – The work must not be a mere copy of a 
pre-existing work and it originates with the author.213 Secondly, authorial contribution –
There must exist skill, intelligence, knowledge, ingenuity, expertise, labour or expense that 
is exercised by the author in producing the work (Australian approach),214 or the work must 
represent non-trivial variation or author’s creativity (U.S. approach).215 In terms of copyright 
infringement, as posited by Lord Reid in Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) 
Ltd, the step to ascertain whether a work is protected by copyright is ‘first to determine 
whether the plaintiff’s work as a whole is “original” and protected by copyright, and then to 
inquire whether the part taken by the defendant is substantial’.216 
However, such approaches to subsistence and infringement of copyright are very problematic, 
especially in the case of new forms of creative works (such as music remixing,217 sampling,218 
                                                     
209 S Ricketson, The law of Intellectual Property: Copyright, Design & Confidential Information (Lawbook Co., last updated 
September 2008) 7.60. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid, 7.45. 
212 ‘[T]here are two sets of skill and labour exercised by Nine and its employees in the creation of the Weekly Schedule. First, the skill 
and labour of selecting and arranging the programs to be shown on Nine to attract viewers to programs in the different timeslots and to 
meet competitors’ programs. For the purposes of these proceedings, this is the "antecedent" or "preparatory" skill and labour in the 
sense discussed in Ladbroke at 287–8 per Lord Hodson and Desktop at [132] and [160] per Lindgren J, [371] and [409] per Sackville J. 
Secondly, there is the skill and labour of drafting the synopses, selecting and arranging the additional program information such as 
classifications and consumer advice and recording, weekly, all of the information into documentary form, the Weekly Schedule.’ See 
[2007] FCA 1172, 46; [2008] FCAFC 71, 60, 61. 
213 This can be seen in both U.S. cases such as Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwin Pictures Corp. 81 F.2.d 49 (2nd Cir 1936), Feist Pubs., Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc. 499 U.S. 340 (1991) and Australian cases, for example University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial 
Press Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 601, Sands & McDougall Pty Ltd v Robinson [1917] HCA 14; (1917) 23 CLR 49, Victoria Park Racing and 
Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479. 
214 This can be seen in Australian cases such as Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 273, Ogden 
Industries Pty Ltd v Kis (Australia) Pty Ltd (1982) 45 ALR 129, Eric Vale Pty Ltd v Thompson & Morgan (Ipswich) Ltd (1994) 29 IPR 
489. 
215 This can be seen in U.S. cases such as Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951), Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwin Pictures Corp. 81 F.2.d 49 (2nd Cir 1936), Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
216 [1964] 1 WLR 273 per Lord Reid at 277. 
217‘A remix is an alternative version of a song, different from the original version. A remixer uses audio mixing to compose an 
alternate master recording of a song, adding or subtracting elements, or simply changing the equalization, dynamics, pitch, tempo, 
playing time, or almost any other aspect of the various musical components. Some remixes involve substantial changes to the 
arrangement of a recorded work, but many are subtle, such as creating a "vocal up" version of an album cut that emphasizes the lead 
singer's voice.’ See further, Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Remix> at 13 October 2008. 
218 ‘In music, sampling is the act of taking a portion, or sample, of one sound recording and reusing it as an instrument or element of a 
new recording. This is typically done with a sampler, which can be a piece of hardware or a computer program on a digital computer. 
Sampling is also possible with tape loops or with vinyl records on a phonograph.’ See further, Wikipedia 
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and digital mashup of music or video219) and new patterns of creativity (such as wiki-like 
collaborative, distributed and participatory creativity). In many cases, remixing, sampling, 
mashup and other forms of digital creations are just re-combination, re-editing, 
representation or re-interpretation of existing materials. Consequently, the entire expressive 
elements of such creative outputs are usually copied from its pre-existing works. In this way, 
the borrowed materials are “recontextualized”. The possibilities of such practices have been 
especially facilitated by the advance of information technology. As observers of music 
sampling in early 1990s had pointed out, ‘[t]he range of options available either to the 
consumer or the creator for the recontexualization of existent recordings has been 
substantially enlarged by computer technology.’220  
It is arguable which category of subject matter would such works fall into. Adaptation? – It is 
hardly possible that they could satisfy the statutory definition of “adaptation” under 
copyright law;221  Compilation?  – Compilation is a collection of short works, most often 
poetry or short stories. The meaning and functionality of both artistic and factual 
compilation emanate from each individual parts of the compilation rather than from the 
compilation as a whole work. In other words, each component of the compilation is used as 
an independent work. By contrast, remixing, sampling or mashup speaks as a whole work 
and the meaning given by the work does not emanate from its individual components but 
from the work as a whole body. 
Besides, could the acts of remixing, sampling or mashup gives rise to the subsistence of 
copyright? It is reasonable to say that such acts are exercise of skill, knowledge, labour, or 
creativity. Therefore, in this sense, it is very likely that works generated by such acts qualify 
for copyright protection. It is an established rule that a new work that is derived from earlier 
works could attract copyright in its own right provided the author has expended sufficient 
independent skill, knowledge and labour in bringing it into material form.222 The copyright 
subsists in remixing, sampling or mashup as a whole and would not extend to its underlying 
works or any elements borrowed from other works. 
In addition, as being derived from earlier works, the new work must be a product of 
independent creation. It must be something more than a copy and must possess a 
“distinguishable variation” or “non-trivial variation” from prior works. 223  In relation to 
derivative works which form a series of evolving productions, Australian courts ‘have been 
                                                                                                                                                             
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sampling_(music)> at 13 October 2008. 
219 ‘A digital mashup is a digital media file containing any or all of text, graphics, audio, video and animation drawn from pre-existing 
sources, to create a new derivative work.’ See further, Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mashup_(digital)> at 13 October 2008; 
See also ‘Mashup (music)’ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mashup_(music)> at 13 October 2008; ‘Mashup (video)’ 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mashup_(video)> at 13 October 2008. 
220 David Sanjek, ‘“Don’t Have to DJ No More”: Sampling and the “Autonomous” Creator’, (1992) 10 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment 
Law Journal, 608. 
221 For example, under s 10 of Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) of Australia, “adaptation” means: (a)  in relation to a literary work in a non ‑ 
dramatic form a version of the work (whether in its original language or in a different language) in a dramatic form;  (b)  in 
relation to a literary work in a dramatic form a version of the work (whether in its original language or in a different language) in a 
non ‑ dramatic form;  (ba)  in relation to a literary work being a computer program--a version of the work (whether or not in the 
language, code or notation in which the work was originally expressed) not being a reproduction of the work;  (c)  in relation to a 
literary work (whether in a non ‑ dramatic form or in a dramatic form): (i)  a translation of the work; or (ii)  a version of the 
work in which a story or action is conveyed solely or principally by means of pictures; and (d)  in relation to a musical work--an 
arrangement or transcription of the work. 
222 See further, L B (Plastics) Ltd v Swish Products Ltd [1979] RPC 551. 
223 See general, Alfred bell& Co. v Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. 191 F2d 99 (2d Cir 1951); Alva Studios, Inc. v Winninger 177 F Supp 265 
(SDNY 1959); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v Snyder 536 F2d 486 (2d Cir 1976) (en banc). 
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prepared to find sufficient originality, even where the work involved may be little more than 
reproducing a modified or corrected version of an earlier work.’224 In the case of remixing, 
sampling or mashup, the variation in the new version of music, picture or video is likely to be 
sufficient to satisfy the “independent creation” standard for the subsistence of copyright. But, 
doubts on the cultural merits of these creations remain.225 
However, in terms of copyright infringement, remixing, sampling, mashup or other forms of 
digital creations is very unlikely to be able to pass the independent creation and 
substantiality tests, as such creations, by their very nature, are re-combination of elements 
and components appropriated from pre-existing works.226 Although the empirical study of 
online user-generated videos shows that a substantial amount of this content uses 
copyrighted works in ways that are eligible for fair use consideration, legal uncertainties in 
respect of these works cannot be ignored yet. The appeals to the establishment of rules 
immunizing copyright liability for such creations have arisen in many countries.227 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE PLACE OF CREATIVITY IN 
COPYRIGHT LAW 
Since the British Statue of Anne 1710, the intention of encouraging learning and thus 
enhancing creativity has found its place in the law of copyright,228 and many following 
legislation and case law expressly declare that the primary purpose of copyright law is to 
stimulate creativity by rewarding creation for the general public good. However, this is not 
easy. On one hand, the stated purpose and associated theory are full of paradoxes; on the 
other hand, the changing social context keeps challenging the way in which the stated aim 
could be accomplished. Furthermore, in contrast with “stimulating creativity”, copyright’s 
effect on enhancing creativity through allowing adequate access to creative works and 
encouraging learning has been overlooked, unconsciously but deliberately.  
In a networked information society, the rise of a participatory and read/write culture comes 
along with the prevalence of everyday creativity. Technologies and information 
infrastructure have afforded people various possibilities to participate in creative activities, 
                                                     
224 S Ricketson, The law of Intellectual Property: Copyright, Design & Confidential Information (Lawbook Co., last updated 
September 2008) 7.100; See also Namol Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Pty Ltd [1993] AIPC 39; New England Country Homes Pty Ltd v 
Moore (1999) 82 FCR 500. 
225 For example, while commenting on the creation of Pop, a popular music critic questioned whose song it was. He wrote, ‘it 
sometimes seems that sophisticated copying has overtaken innovation, that an exhausted culture can only trot out endless retreads.’ 
Jon Pareles, ‘In Pop, Whose Song is It, Anyway?’ (27 August 1989) New York Times (Arts & Leisure). 
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contribute their own information and knowledge and thus create their own versions of 
culture. Dick Hebdige called it as a process of “versioning” which is ‘a democratic principle 
because it implies that no one has the final say. Everybody has a chance to make a 
contribution’.229 In order to enhance literacy and creativity in such a context, copyright law 
should allow more room for the use and re-use of copyrighted works.  Further, as more and 
more often, non-monetary incentives suffice to stimulate creativity, the incentive structure 
and its effect should be re-examined. Therefore, to achieve its purpose, optimizing creativity 
of creators and users (potential creators) and balancing conflicting interests, copyright 
should adopt a “rights vs. rights” instead of a “rights plus limitations” approach. Particularly, 
copyright law should recognize, for instance, fair use, transformative use, compulsory 
licensing, etc. as statutory user’s right. To reconcile the conflicts of interests, copyright law 
should develop a flexible benefit sharing scheme desired by all stakeholders.230  
To this end, this chapter concludes that the established rules in respect of subsistence and 
infringement of copyright in world copyright legislation may acquire new development, 
especially in the cases of new forms of creative works and new patterns of creativity. 
Creative contribution may be perceived and recognized in according to various motivations in 
different cases and to its specific commercial or non-commercial nature. 
 
                                                     
229 Dick Hebdige, Cut ’N’ Mix: Culture, Identity and Caribbean Music (1987) xv. 
230 See further, Chapter 4: A Relational Theory of Authorship. 
